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This paper examines whether two regions should remain together within a ﬁscal federation, or separate,
when their inhabitants have different preferences for publicly provided goods. The paper focuses on
trade-offs between returns to scale in the provision of the goods, and the scope to tailor provision to the
tastes of the inhabitants in each region. A general model is developed that includes, as special cases, both
pure public and publicly provided goods, and regional and national public goods. We show that when
there is a choice between public investment and consumption goods, there will, in general, be a bias
against public consumption goods unless taxing powers are fully devolved. We provide conditions under
which independence may be desirable even when the region contemplating independence is
relatively small.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
It is a real pleasure for me to contribute this paper in honor of
Richard Arnott. Richard studied with me at Yale, and then went on to
become a friend and co-author. We did work together in a wide range
of areas, in labor markets and the economics of information; in public
economics and urban economics, publishing 14 papers over a span of
approximately 15 years (listed in the appendix). When I went to work
in the Clinton Administration, we were working on a book on the
general theory of moral hazard, putting together our many results in
this ﬁeld and extending them. That book, unfortunately, never got
ﬁnished.
The papers that we wrote together are among my favorites. Our
paper providing the basic analytics of moral hazard (Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1988), showing the inherent non-convexities which arise in
the presence of moral hazard, provides the simplest and best exposi-
tion of the concepts and analytics of moral hazard. Our subsequent use
of that apparatus to show the Pareto inefﬁciency of markets with
moral hazard not only provides an elegant and simple way of seeing
why markets with asymmetric information are, in general, inefﬁcient,
but has provided a framework which has been subsequently used
extensively in the analysis of macro-economic externalities (Arnott,
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1994).
In this paper, I wish to take up a theme that combines two of
our interests – in public ﬁnance and in externalities. Much of our
work has been concerned with externalities – where, for instance,
the provision of insurance by one company affects the risks faced
by other companies or where the provision of insurance against
one risk affects the likelihood of another risk occurring (Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1990).
As global warming has reminded us, externalities are both
pervasive and of ﬁrst order importance. They are essential in under-
standing the structure of metropolitan regions – the fact that there are
pervasive and important has long been understood to be central to the
organization of municipal governance; fragmented governance results
in highly suboptimal outcomes. But there may be important trade-offs
– Tiebout (1956) argued that there are efﬁciency beneﬁts from
competition among local communities, though the conditions under
which such competition results in efﬁciency (let alone the maximiza-
tion of an inequality averse social welfare function) are highly restr-
ictive (Stiglitz, 1977, 1983a, 1983b).
Similar issues arise in the analysis of federalism. Recently, Scotland
had a referendum about whether to become independent (again,
because it was not until 1707 that it merged with England, in a process
that has been described as highly corrupt. See Bowie, 2007). Those
opposed to independence suggested that there were economies of
scale and scope that would be lost as a result of independence, and
that as a result, an independent Scotland would be poorer.
Unlike other independence movements, those arguing for inde-
pendence were not nationalistic, though they typically argued that
independence would strengthen their sense of national identity and
social cohesion. Some recent work in economics argues that there can
be signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts from social cohesion2.
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But other arguments were central for the advocates of indepen-
dence. The ﬁrst was that independence would allow a more effective
expression of preferences with respect to public goods. There was a
general consensus that preferences towards public goods in Scotland
differed markedly from those in England. With Scotland being less
than 10 per cent of the UK, the structure of public expenditures and
taxes would inevitably be dominated by England.3
Those in England argued that devolution could solve the problem.
Complete devolution, of course, is independence. The distinction
between devolution and independence then depends on the set of
responsibilities and powers that are not devolved. Typically, foreign
policy is one example of a power that is almost never devolved.
This paper provides a simple model showing the conditions
under which, in spite of economies of scale that are inherent in the
provision of public goods, devolution is nonetheless desirable; and
this may be true even if the country seeking devolution is small.
What is critical is the relationship between the differences in
preferences between the area seeking devolution and the rest and
the magnitude of the scale economies. But it goes further in
arguing that it may not be desirable to just devolve authority over
the allocation of expenditures. There has to be at least some
independence in tax authority.
In many instances of ﬁscal federalism, there is both some devolu-
tion of expenditure and tax authority. But the model presented here
goes further: if the central authority derives any income from the
taxation of income or property within the region with devolved
power, the decisions with respect to the allocation between public
consumption and investment will be distorted. While independence
would remove this distortion, we do not address the broader question
of whether there are politically feasible ways of dealing with the
distortion short of independence.
Debates about devolution and the opposite – delegating some
rights to a supra-national power, e.g. the EU or an international trade
agreement – illustrate that there are an array of responsibilities and
constraints that can be designed in a myriad of ways. With block
grants, sub-national units can choose what to spendmoney on (within
a speciﬁed range), but they still may not have the power to tax. With
trade agreements, countries have access to all the economies of scale
and scope in private production. But such agreements typically
circumscribe the ability of the individual country to impose regulatory
regimes that might reﬂect the country's preferences and judgments
about risks.
This paper, motivated in part by the Scottish devolution debate,
focuses on a context in which the political entities will be part of a
common trading area even if devolution occurs, so there are no
implications for the production and distribution of private goods. The
focus is only on the choice of the level and kinds of public goods to be
provided. We focus, in particular, on the institutional arrangement
proposed at the time, where there was devolution of the power to
allocate expenditures among different publicly provided goods, but
the power to tax (largely) remained centralized. But devolution of
expenditure allocation without full devolution of taxation presents a
problem: the returns to investments (e.g. in education, industrial
policies, infrastructure) are not fully captured because the revenues
from investment are shared between regions. This is particularly true
for a small country, like Scotland: the bulk of at least the tax beneﬁts
go to others. There is thus a bias against investment.
Full devolution of taxing power, on the other hand, undermines
one of the critical arguments for federation: redistribution. (Indeed,
part of the basis of many independence movements is that richer
regions wish to avoid the redistribution that results from their being
part of a larger federal system. But with Scotland and Quebec arguably
poorer than the rest of the country, this was not part of the motivation
for their independence movements.)
This paper builds on a considerable literature examining the
formation of political entities – both the Nash equilibrium and the
optimum. To simplify the analysis, we abstract from issues of
distribution by assuming that incomes are identical. Part I provides a
brief overview of that literature, clarifying the different dimensions of
economies of scale and scope which have played an important role in
earlier discussions. Part II focuses on the limitations of devolution of
expenditures in the absence of devolution of taxation.
1.1. Toward a more general theory of devolution
In Section 2, we describe the basic determinants of the
formation of political entities and some of the key results in the
earlier literature, while Section 3 extends the analytics.
2. The basic determinants and some key results
Both economic and political considerations enter into the decisions
concerning the number of political entities and the relationship
among political entities – the extent of devolution. The strong
economic forces leading to large entities with limited devolution are
related to returns to scale often associated with public goods, and the
difﬁculties of internalizing cross-border externalities. Two of the
important forces militating for smaller entities are diseconomies of
scale (congestion costs, increasing costs of managing large political
entities) and diversity of preferences. In many ways, the issues are
parallel to those in the theory of the ﬁrm, and indeed, some of the
literature below explicitly draws upon that analogy. In the absence of
diversity of preferences, the optimal scale of the ﬁrm (in a world with
a large enough population) is that which minimizes average costs –
where the (marginal) beneﬁts of increasing scale are just equal to the
marginal costs. With diversity of preferences, there is a trade-off
between a lower average cost of production and the ability to better
match preferences, the central issue in the theory of monopolistic
competition.4
In the case of political entities, there are further political
considerations: there are intrinsic problems in preference revela-
tion for public goods, and some have argued that smaller jurisdic-
tions may be able to make decisions more reﬂective of the
preferences of their citizens5. Moreover, political entities often
engage in signiﬁcant redistribution among different groups. Those
who believe that they are being exploited have an incentive to
establish their own political entities. In principle, the “exploiters”
should limit their exploitation to levels where the losses from not
being part of a larger entity (beneﬁting from the returns to scale)
just induce the group contemplating succeeding not doing so.
Finally, as we comment in the concluding section of this paper,
there are issues of national identity that inﬂuence some groups to
want to have their own entity – even if the economic costs of
doing so, at least as reﬂected in standard approaches, are sig-
niﬁcant. In this paper, we largely ignore these political considera-
tions, though we note that certain political constraints (e.g. in the
extent of tax discrimination) may play an important role in
determining the formation of political entities.
3 Differences in patterns of expenditure between Scotland and England have
long historical and cultural roots, with greater access to education and substantially
lower university tuition in Scotland than in England (see Herman, 2001).
4 See e.g. () building on the fundamental work of Hotelling (1929). In some
formulations, such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) individuals care about having a
diversity of goods. One can have more goods, but only at the cost of a higher
average cost of production for each.
5 Agency costs may be smaller.
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2.1. The basic components to the analysis
In this section, we provide a broad framework, which encom-
passes most earlier analyses as special cases, within which we can
assess the importance of the economies and diseconomies of scale.
2.1.1. Technology
The literature on the formation of political entities has implicitly
focused on three properties of the technology of publicly provided
goods: (a) the magnitude of the marginal cost of delivering the good
to an additional individual; (b) the magnitude of the marginal cost of
expanding the geographical provision of the publicly provided good;
and (c) the costs associated with increasing the variety of public goods,
e.g. tailoring the provision of the goods to differences in tastes.
Thus, the cost function Ei (i.e., expenditure) of providing a
quantity of public good i, Gi, depends on the number of individuals
served, mi, the number of locales (regions) served, ni, and the
variety of “designs” with which it is provided, vi:6
Ei ¼ψ i Gi;mi:ni; vi
 
: ð2:1Þ
In this formulation, a deﬁning characteristic of the publicly
provided good is that the quantity provided to all individuals is the
same. A simple parametric form is







Much of the literature has focused on certain limiting cases.
Samuelson (1954) considered a pure public good with zero marginal
cost of providing the good to an additional individual regardless of his
location and with one variety, i.e. γ¼0, vi¼1, and β¼0, so
Ei ¼ Gi: ð2:2aÞ
Many publicly provided goods, like education and health, are close
to publicly provided private goods where there are no economies of
scale – the marginal cost of providing the service or good to an
additional individual is close to the average cost. (One might ask, if
these are really private goods, why are they publicly provided? There
is a large literature answering this question, related to market failures,
the beneﬁts of enhancing social cohesion through publicly provided
education, and ensuring the attainment of basic rights, such as the
access to health care. These are important issues, but take us beyond
the scope of this paper.7)
Stiglitz (1974) considered this case of publicly provided private
goods, again in one locale and with one variety, so that γ¼0, vi¼1,
and β¼1 and the cost function then becomes
Ei ¼miGi ð2:2bÞ
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) look at the full range, from
Samuelsonian public goods to publicly provided private goods,
i.e. γ¼0, vi¼1, and 0rβr1.
As we noted, for Samuelsonian public goods, the marginal cost
of provision to any individual is zero regardless of location. Tiebout
(1956) and Stiglitz (1977) consider local public goods, the beneﬁts
of which can be extended beyond the community only at very high
costs. Fire departments and local police protection are examples of
local public goods. Consider for simplicity the symmetric case
where all communities are of the same size and the public good is
provided in one variety. Then the cost function for a Samuelsonian
local public good provided to n locales is
Ei ¼ nGi; ð2:2cÞ
that is γ¼1, vi¼1, and β¼0. In the polar opposite case of locally
provided pure private goods, it is plausible that the cost function
will be as in (2.2b), where mi is the total number served in all
communities. But there may be ﬁxed costs of delivering even
private goods to different communities, so that costs increase both
with the number of individuals served and the number of indiv-
iduals served.8
Once one recognizes the territorial dimension of public goods9,
the analysis can be extended down or up. Stiglitz (1995) focused
on international, or global, public goods, the beneﬁts of which
could be extended to anyone living anywhere in the world with no
marginal costs. Knowledge is an obvious example of a global
public good, as is global warming.10 One could easily formulate
models in which the costs of extending the geographical reach of
the public good ranged from zero to inﬁnity.
Different individuals have preferences for goods with different
characteristics, and such preferences may systematically differ across
regions. In some cases, it may be easy to alter the characteristics of the
goods to reﬂect differences in preferences (assume, for instance, that
there were differences in preferences for the kinds of trees or ﬂowers
in parks), i.e. σ¼0. In other cases, there may be signiﬁcant costs in
providing goods with different characteristics – if the costs of the
public good are basically ﬁxed costs, the costs may increase with the
number of varieties provided, i.e. σ¼1. In still other cases, it is only
feasible to have one variety – a country can have only one defense/
offense posture; this can be captured by assuming that σ is inﬁnite.11
2.1.2. The economic environment
There are four critical characteristics of the overall economic
environment that affect the formation of political entities: (a) the
existence of congestion, or other sources of diseconomies of scale;
(b) diversity of tastes; (c) limits on the size of the overall population;
and (d) the extent of mobility of individuals.
The technological characteristics described in the previous
paragraphs describe the nature of the returns to scale. Economies
of scale provide the rationale for having large communities. The
existence of congestion and the presence of large differences in
tastes explain some of the reasons that one may want to limit the
size of a community or nation. Limits on the size of the overall
population in the presence of diversity of tastes provides one of
the reasons that there may be communities with diversity of
preferences. (With congestion costs, there will typically be an
optimal size of the community; with an arbitrarily large popula-
tion and a ﬁnite number of types of individuals, then so long as
individuals do not differ in their productive capacities, there will
be homogeneous preferences within communities.)
Tiebout argued that with mobility, there was a further signiﬁcant
advantage from having a large number of competing communities:
competition among communities would ensure efﬁciency and provide
the basis of preference revelation – individuals would choose the
community to live in which best matched their preferences, thus
resolving the longstanding issue in the theory of public goods of
6 This obviously greatly simpliﬁes. We should specify the number of indivi-
duals in each region, the number of varieties offered to each individual and
provided in each region, etc.
7 Many are, in fact, closely associated with inequalities in income and wealth,
which we are explicitly not addressing in this paper.
8 that is, Ei¼mi Giþζ ni where ζ is the ﬁxed cost of serving a community.
9 It should be clear that society can be divided in other ways, besides
geography, and there may be marginal costs of providing goods to different groups.
This may be particularly important when there is an attempt to “tailor” public
goods to differences in preferences.
10 See (Stiglitz, 1999) for a discussion of knowledge as global public good, and
Stiglitz (1998) for a discussion of international ﬁnancial institutions as global public
goods. For broader discussions, (see Kaul et al., 1999; Stiglitz, 2007).
11 There is an alternative formulation, in which each variety of public good is
treated as a separate good, and there can be economies or diseconomies of scope in
production.
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preference revelation. As Oates (1999) points out, and as the above
discussion should have made clear, there are other reasons both for
delegating the provision of certain public goods to local jurisdictions
and other reasons for having multiple political jurisdictions.
Tiebout never showed that Tiebout competition would result in
Pareto efﬁciency, and it turns out that the conditions under which
that is the case are highly restrictive (). For instance, if there are a
ﬁnite number of communities, even if that number is large,
competition among communities is much like monopolistic com-
petition. And it is well-known that only under very restrictive
conditions is the equilibrium with monopolistic competition
Pareto efﬁcient.12 Later, we will illustrate more precisely the
nature of some of the inefﬁciencies which arise.
But the presence of these inefﬁciencies provides an important
rationale for not decentralizing and not forming separate political
entities: actions by one political entity (or those within one entity)
may exert externalities on others. In principle, with a central
political authority, those externalities could be internalized, and a
Pareto superior outcome achieved.
2.1.3. Political constraints
But whether those externalities are effectively addressed depends
on still one more set of key variables determining the desirability of
creating independent entities: the nature of the political processes. In
systems of majority voting, for instance, the majority may pay little
attention to the preferences of the minority, or may even exploit them.
A natural response is for the minority to secede. The threat of
secession itself can change the outcome. The Constitution of Ethiopia
included a provision which allowed regions to vote to secede. It was
put there because those who had succeeded in overthrowing the Derg
regime, disproportionately from a minority region (Tigray) which felt
that it had long been oppressed by those from the region surrounding
the capital Addis Ababa, wanted to prevent such abuses from
occurring in the future. But they had not fully anticipated that a
region might vote to secede not because it had been oppressed, but
simply as an expression of national identity, or because politicians,
wanting greater political power for themselves, might successfully
persuade citizens that they would be better off with secession – even
if there were signiﬁcant economies of scale which would have called
for the country remaining united.
Modeling constraints on the political process is not easy; but there
is an important literature showing how different political structures
affect the supply of public goods (see, e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001;
Persson et al., 2000; Qianand and Roland, 1998), and therefore
presumably the desirability of devolution or the creation of indepen-
dent political entities. While some claim that moving decision making
closer to the people – devolution and creating separate political
entities – makes government more responsive, the public good is a
public good – i.e. there may even be scale returns in governance itself,
so that civil society representing the interests of ordinary citizens may
be more effective in larger political bodies. Indeed, in the United
States, much of conﬂict over delegation of decision making to states
revolves around differences in “voice” of different groups at different
levels, which can be especially important when there are signiﬁcant
differences in deviations for majoritarian decision-making at different
levels. Rural and corporate interests often tend to be more inﬂuential
at the state level.13
The existence of political constraints – including constraints on the
ability to make commitments and to differentiate among different
individuals (individuals at different locations)14 – is in many ways
pivotal to the analysis. For in the absence of such constraints,
presumably there would be no reason to establish separate political
entities. A centralized entity could always decentralize (engaging in
optimal ﬁscal federalism), internalizing all the externalities, balancing
off optimally the economies of scale and scope with the diseconomies
arising from congestion and preference diversity; but at the same
time, it could internalize all the externalities.15 16
In this paper, we will abstract from these important considera-
tions, simplifying the analysis to assume majority rule and con-
straining the government's ability to differentiate tax treatment of
different individuals. The later analysis will make clear why this
constraint is important.
There is one further important aspect of ﬁscal federalism: as we
have already noted, government typically provides an array of public
goods, ﬁnanced by an array of taxes. Typically, there is some devolu-
tion of some decision making with respect to the provision of some
public goods and services and the levying of some taxes, but not of
others. Independence can be thought of as the limiting case where
there is devolution of all goods and services and taxes – with no
constraints imposed at the national level. (That, of course, does not
mean that there cannot be cooperation and coordination, e.g. to
address cross-border spillovers; even if externalities are not perfectly
addressed, they need not be ignored.)
Typically, there is considerable devolution of education and
health, and none of defense and foreign policy. Even the advocates
of independence often grant that there may be some beneﬁts to
the provision of some “national” public goods at the national/
federal level, but that the disadvantages of non-devolution in the
case of others exceed these beneﬁts. Again, in the analysis below,
we will ignore these complexities, but will focus (in Part II) on one
central aspect of independence vs. devolution: so long as there is a
national income tax, under devolution, there will be distortions in the
choice between public investment and consumption goods.
2.2. Some general results
In the previous subsection, we described the crucial ingredients in
our analysis – technology, the economic environment, and political
constraints. Results are highly contingent on the speciﬁc assumptions
made with respect to each. Many of those most widely discussed
represent special cases, as we shall see.
2.2.1. Some simple limiting cases
Most of the literature on the formation of public entities has
focused on certain limiting cases. For instance, in the absence of
congestion or diversity, with a pure public good, there should be
only one community; and the same would be true even if there is
diversity of preferences, if there are no costs to providing the
12 Stiglitz (1986a) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
13 For a more extensive discussion of decentralization issues in the context of
development (see Faguet and Pöschl, 2015).
14 The discussion above provides part of the explanation for limitations in the
ability to differentiate the provision of goods to different regions/locales/
(footnote continued)
individuals: the nature of technology means that there may be substantial costs in
doing so. There is an optimal degree of differentiation. But this does not provide a
full explanation, especially in the case of publicly provided private goods. Concerns
about fairness, of ensuring that no one is treated better than another – when it is
difﬁcult to assess what is better – provide support for equality of provision. In the
case of education, there are concerns about creating a sense of solidarity and
building cohesion.
15 In the context of production of private goods and the theory of the ﬁrm,
Stiglitz(forthcoming) has referred to this as the Centralization Paradox, which is
partially resolved by taking into account constraints on the ability to make
commitments.
16 One might be tempted to argue that in such an idealized world, Coasian
bargaining could just as well result in an efﬁcient outcome among a set of
communities/nations of optimal size, provided that there was an appropriate
assignment of property rights. But there would need to be a global political
authority to assign such property rights. And even with such an assignment, in
general Coasian bargaining does not achieve an efﬁcient outcome, in the presence
of transactions costs and/or information asymmetries.
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appropriate diverse mix of public goods (μ¼0). But with a publicly
provided private good, with no economies of scale, there is no
reason to have a large community. Hence, if there are differences
in preferences across local communities, there would be no rea-
son not to form separate political entities for the provision of
these goods.
2.2.2. Optimal city sizes and the Henry George theorem
There are some other limiting cases where the results are not so
immediate. For instance, in the case of local public goods in economies
with congestion (or other sources of decreasing returns to scale
offsetting the increasing returns associated with the provision of a
local public good), there is an optimal city size, with a number of
authors independently obtaining the result that in that optimal city,
what Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) refer to as the Henry George Theorem –
where expenditures on public goods equals land rents – holds.17
George (1879) had much earlier argued for the imposition of a land
tax; this theorem showed that, in cities of the optimal size, such a land
tax was the only tax that was required.)
Individuals may, of course, differ in their preferences between
public goods and private goods, in which case those preferring
more public goods will live in larger communities. Those within
the community will have identical preferences; there will be
unanimity about the spending on public goods.
This result, however, is not general.
2.2.3. Diverse populations: diversity may not matter
The previous result requires in particular that there be an
arbitrarily large population to be divided at will among an arbitrarily
large number of communities and that individuals with different
complementary skills do not have different preferences. If there is an
arbitrarily large population with different skills all of which are
required in production (or, at least, which are complementary in
production), then communities will compete for people with different
skills. The attractiveness of a community to a worker with a particular
set of skills will be determined by the set of public goods it provides
and the wages. In this case, in general, there will again be commu-
nities of an optimal size, with again the size of the community
depending on the extent of preferences for public goods (the balance
between diseconomies of scale associated with congestion and
economies of scale with public goods occurs at a larger population.)
The equilibrium will be efﬁcient.
Unlike the previous case, communities will consist of a diverse
population. Plumbers and carpenters may have different prefer-
ences from bankers and doctors, but it is efﬁcient for them to live
together. But perhaps surprisingly, there is still unanimity: for each
will take into account the effect of changing the mix of public
goods on the supply price of labor with different skills (). Diversity
need not be the basis of division.
2.2.4. Diversity of preferences may matter: a model with a
continuum of individuals
Under more general conditions diversity matters, and it can matter
even with a continuum of individuals and an inﬁnite number of com-
munities, even without congestion and joint production – if there is
sufﬁcient diversity of preferences, as the following model illustrates.
Assume there is a continuum of locations at which individuals
may locate themselves (from minus to plus inﬁnity), public goods
are provided at the center of each city, and individuals have to pay
transport costs, equal to kt in traveling a distance t from their
location to the city center. The equilibrium results in an inﬁnite
number of identical cities, separated by a distance, 2 T. Only one
person can be located at each point. Land half way between two
cities has a (differential) land rent of zero. Land at a distance t from
the city center rents for R(t). In equilibrium, R(t)¼ROkt, where
Ro¼kT, i.e. individuals are indifferent as to their location. We
denote by R* total rents, and assume that rents are spent on the
provision of public goods, with the excess of G, public expendi-
tures, over R* being ﬁnanced by a lump sum tax. Net income to be
spent on private consumption goods, C, is
C ¼ Y–R 0ð Þ–ðGRnÞ=2T ; ð2:3Þ
where Y is the individual's income (all individuals are assumed




kt dt ¼ kT2; ð2:4Þ
since rent at the boundary is 019, while rent at the city center is
R 0ð Þ ¼ kT : ð2:5Þ
Substituting (2.4) and (2.5) into (2.3), we obtain
C ¼ Y–G=2TkT=2: ð2:6Þ
Hence for given G, C is maximized when
T2 ¼ G=k; ð2:7Þ
or using (2.4)
Rn ¼ G; ð2:8Þ
the standard Henry George Theorem. Substituting (2.7) into
(2.6) and simplifying, we obtain that in cities of the optimal size
C ¼ Y– Gkð Þ1=2 ð2:9Þ
so if the utility function for public and private goods is
U ¼ u Cð ÞþξG; ð2:10Þ




 1=2 ¼ ξ: ð2:11Þ
If public goods are more important relative to private goods (i.e.
ξ is larger), the optimal size of the community is larger, rents are
larger, and government expenditures are larger.
This equilibrium is both Pareto efﬁcient and is the utilitarian
optimum. Indeed, each individual has the same level of utility
since declining rents offset the costs of increased “distance” that
an individual incurs as they locate further from the city center.
But in the product variety interpretation of the Hotelling model, it
is not possible to identify precisely the preferences of each individual –
and therefore to eliminate the consumers' surplus associated with
having the public good of a type which conforms to their preferences.
In this case, each individual has a preferred “type” of public
good, deﬁned again by their location on the line. There is a ﬁxed
cost of a public good of a particular type (which comes in a ﬁxed
size, normalized at unity). An individual whose preferred type is
α* has utility
UðC;Gð1kjαnαj ÞÞ; ð2:12Þ
17 Many of these authors posed the question in slightly different ways (see, e.g.
Serck-Hanssen, 1969; Starrett, 1974; Flatters et al., 1974; Vickrey, 1977). As Arnott
(1998) observes, the results is quite robust. Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) go on to show
that in their idealized model, expenditures on public goods are equal to one half of
aggregate transport costs.
18 If GoRn, the difference is distributed as a lump sum payment to individuals.
19 When land is scarce, it may have a positive value for other users such as
agriculture. It is only the differential rents at the boundary that are zero. Notice that
in this linear city with linear transport costs, aggregate differential rents equal
aggregate transport costs. This contrasts with Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) who
analyze circular cities, in which case aggregate differential rents equal one half
aggregate transport costs. As we note, the Henry George theorem obtains in
either case.
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where again C is his level of private consumption. But the utility he
gets from each unit is reduced by the distance of the good from his
preferred type, |α*α|. k is a measure of the strength of his preference
for his preferred type. The mathematics for the optimal spacing of
communities/optimal number of communities follows along the lines
of the previous case.
2.2.5. Inefﬁcient equilibria
These limiting cases are misleading: in more normal circum-
stances there are a ﬁnite number of communities, and then, as we
have noted, there is no assurance that even with perfect mobility,
the equilibrium which emerges will be efﬁcient.
Consider, for instance, a situation where there are M individuals
with diverse preferences, and there are two islands, call them the
North and the South, indexed by j. Assume there is mobility across the
islands, and that each island faces congestion costs. We simplify by
assuming that the only way in which individuals differ is in the
intensity of their preference for public goods. We assume further that
all individuals have the same income, there is a lump sum tax τj on
island j, and that individuals have a demand for land in the commu-
nity inwhich they live that depends on the rental rate per unit of land,
rj. Individuals will divide themselves between the islands, with those
with a stronger preference for public goods living on one island, which
we assume to be the North. All land within an island is homogeneous,
so the rent is the same.
Utility is a function of the public good, the private good, the
rent per unit of land, r, and the congestion level
U Y–τj;Gj; rj;Mj
 
; j¼N; S: ð2:13Þ
Clearly
MNþMS ¼M ð2:14Þ
Equilibrium land rents on the two islands are such as to make the
demand for land on each island equal to the supply. The marginal
individual, who is indifferent between the islands, has a stronger
preference for public goods than anyone (else) on S, and weaker
preferences for public goods than anyone (else) on N. If GN increases, e.
g. ﬁnanced by an increase in a tax on landlords (while GS is ﬁxed), then
the marginal individual will shift from the South to the North, rN
increases and rS decreases.
The government of island j chooses Gj, τj, and the tax rate on
rents on island j, τRj . Let Rj denote the aggregate rents on island j.
The public good is funded from revenues from the lump sum tax
and rent taxes so that
Gj ¼ τjMjþτRjRj; ð2:15Þ
If we normalize the size of the land on each island at unity,
Rj¼rj.
We focus on a Nash equilibrium, where each island takes the
value of the policy variables of the other island as given. The
choice of each island depends on the political system. Assume, for
simplicity, that majority rule prevails on each island. In the
absence of migration, and assuming, in equilibrium, the median
voter neither is renting in or renting out land, so changes in r have
no effect on his well-being.20
∂U=∂G
 mM¼ ∂U=∂C m; ð2:16Þ
where the superscript m refers to the median voter. This is




 j ¼ 1; ð2:17Þ
i.e. that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution is equal to
one. The two conditions would be the same if the marginal rate of
substitution of the median voter was equal to the average




 m ¼ Σ ∂U=∂G j= ∂U=∂C jh i=M ð2:18Þ
As is well known,21 whether
ðΣ ∂U=∂G j= ∂U=∂C jÞ=M4 or o ∂U=∂G m= ∂U=∂C m ð2:19Þ
depends on the shape of the utility functions and the prob-
ability distribution of tastes. If, for instance, the utility function is
separable in private and public consumption,
U ¼ u Yτ; r;Mð Þþξv Gð Þ ð2:20Þ
where ξ reﬂects the intensity of preferences for G, then if there
is a symmetric probability distribution of ξ around the median,
then the mean and median marginal rate of substitution are the
same. For simplicity, we will assume that that is the case, so that in
the absence of migration, the majoritarian voting equilibrium is
Pareto efﬁcient.22
There are three distinct effects of migration: on the political
equilibrium, on rents, and on spending on public goods. The median
voter would realize that by attracting in migration or encouraging
outmigration, he changes his position as the decisive voter, and this
will lead to choices that are less consistent with his preferences.
In-migration always results in more spending on the public
good, G, because of the lump sum tax on individuals. (This
assumes that τj40. If there is a lump sum subsidy, as in Alaska,
the effect would be just the opposite.) The effect of rents on the
well-being of the median voter can be either positive or negative.
Making the island more attractive leads to an increase in rents. To
the extent that rents are taxed to ﬁnance public goods, he beneﬁts.
If the median voter is not a landlord (renting out more land than
he rents in) he beneﬁts from in-migration; if he is not a tenant, he
beneﬁts from outmigration. In the normal case, we might expect
the median voter to be net a tenant, and thus he would like his
island to be less attractive to the marginal migrant.
The key point is that the extent of in or outmigration depends
on the preferences of the marginal individuals, which in the North
entails an individual who has weaker preferences for public goods
than any of the (other) residents on the island, and in the South, a
stronger preference for public goods.
Thus, in a renter-dominated political equilibrium, if the “rental
effect” dominates, each island tries to make itself less attractive.
The North has a higher (than Pareto efﬁcient) level of τ and G, and
the South a lower level. Mobility pushes the two islands apart. By
contrast, in a landlord dominated equilibrium, just the opposite
occurs.
These results can be seen more precisely in a simpliﬁcation of
the above model, where there are M plots of land in each island, of
ﬁxed size, and an overall population of 2M, so that in equilibrium,
precisely half the population lives on each. Though in equilibrium
there is no migration, there is still competition for the lots on each
island. The possibility of migration makes a difference. Under
these assumptions, what individuals care about is the utility from
20 Alternatively,we can assuming that changes in G and τ do not affect the
demand for land, so that in the absence of migration, these changes do not affect r.
More generally, if an increase in G (say ﬁnanced by an increase in the lump sum
tax) increased r, and if the median voter was a renter, he would choose a level of G
smaller than indicated by (2.16).
21 See Stiglitz (1974) or any of the standard textbook treatments, such as
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Stiglitz (1986b) and the references cited there.
22 It should be obvious that there are conditions under which majority voting
leads to too much or too little spending on public goods, relative to the Pareto
efﬁcient level.
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the consumption and public good, which in turn is affected by the
total cost of living on the island, Fj
Fj ¼ τjþrj: ð2:21Þ
With {F, G} on one island ﬁxed, the amount that the marginal
individual is willing to pay to live on the other island is given by
Uμ YF;Gð Þ ¼Un ð2:22Þ
where the superscript μ refers to the marginal resident, and U*
is his utility on the ﬁrst island. An increase in the lump sum tax
just comes out of the rents that individuals pay. An increase in G
implies that the marginal migrant is willing to pay more to live in
the community. He remains indifferent so long as
∂F=∂G¼ ∂U=∂G μ= ∂U=∂C μ: ð2:23Þ





 μ ¼ 1: ð2:24Þ
Because the marginal individual values the public good less




 μoΣ ∂U=∂G j= ∂U=∂C j=M; ð2:25Þ
and there will be an undersupply of the public good in the
North. By the same reasoning, there will be an oversupply in
the South.
On the other hand, in the North if the median voter owns no
land, then so long as GoMF, he will vote for a higher level of G,
even though that results in a higher value of F, as land rents get bid
up
∂U=∂G
 m ∂U=∂C m ∂U=∂G μ= ∂U=∂C μ 40: ð2:26Þ
Thus, the equilibrium level of G is the solution to
UμðYGn=M;GnÞ ¼ Un: ð2:27Þ
With this value of G and the associated taxes, the individual who
least prefers public goods is indifferent between living in that
community or moving to the low tax, low public good community.
There will be an oversupply of public goods in the North (relative to
the Pareto efﬁcient level), and by the same reasoning, an undersupply
in the South.
We have thus seen that competition among communities, when
there is mobility, can lead to either a centrifugal or centripetal force,
moving the communities further apart or closer together, depending
on the nature of the political process (whether landlords or renters
dominate in the political equilibrium.) But even when the political
equilibrium would have resulted in a Pareto efﬁcient allocation with-
out migration, it will not do so with migration. When there are a ﬁnite
number of communities and migration, each worries about how its
political decisions will affect migration and rents, with landlords
wishing to maximize (net of taxes) rents and renters wishing to
reduce rents.
Even if the government within each country were to pursue a
policy which was Pareto efﬁcient for its citizens, it would balance
out the adverse congestion effect with the net beneﬁt to the
community of the additional tax revenues and rent payments –
not taking into account the adverse effects of these policies on the
other community.
In short, whenever there is mobility, there are cross-border
externalities. With integration, these externalities could be inter-
nalized. But integration itself will affect the political equilibrium.
Whether the compensations which would be required to make
sufﬁcient numbers in each of the islands support integration are
feasible, and whether such compensations could be sustained in
the integrated political equilibrium, are questions that would take
us beyond this short paper.
3. The desirability of devolution: static analysis
In this section, we explore the desirability of devolution/
separation in a one period model in the context of a world in
which there are only two regions, denoted North and South. We
will see that there are some conditions under which separation is
never optimal – a pure Samuelsonian public good, where the only
differences in preferences related to the level of expenditures on
the public good, and in which discriminatory taxation is feasible;
and there are other conditions under which separation is always
desirable – in which the public goods are all publicly provided
private goods, in which there are no economies of scale in
production, and there are differences in tastes both with respect
to scale and “type.” Most cases, of course, lie between these two
extremes, which is why the issue of separation/independence is
often so difﬁcult.
3.1. Differences only in the level of provision of the publicly provided
good
Assume there are two regions of equal size with consumers who
value private goods consumption C and public goods consumption
“G”. In the ﬁrst subsection, we will assume that the citizens of the two
regions differ only in the intensity with which they prefer the public
good. In the following section, we will also assume they differ in the
form of their preferred public good.
We assume that everyone in the two regions has the same income,
Y, that the public good is ﬁnanced by a uniform tax on individuals in
the two regions of equal population,M, so consumption of the private
good is YG/2M, and utility in region i is
Vi ¼ Vi Y–G=2M;G ¼ vi G;2Mð Þ: ð3:1Þ
For a ﬁxed M, v is an inverted U shaped function of G, as depicted
in Fig. 1, attaining a maximum at vN* at G*N (2M). Assume those in
community N (for North) prefer more public goods to those in
community S (for South), so that G*N (2M)4G*S(2M) for all M. If
community S is in the majority, community N must decide whether to
go it alone, i.e. whether
vNðGnSð2MÞ;2MÞovNðGnN Mð Þ;MÞ: ð3:2Þ
As the ﬁgure illustrates, this is possible. If there are large
differences in preference, then the North would rather go it alone.
Of course, the South should realize that if (3.2) is satisﬁed, then
N will vote to secede. Hence, it has to ascertain if there is a value of
G such that










Fig. 1. In the federation, with the South determining the equilibrium level of public
goods, the utility of the North, at the value of G chosen by the South, is lower than
the utility that the North could get by going it alone.
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and
vN G;2Mð Þ4vNðGnN Mð Þ;MÞ ð3:4Þ
That is, both the South and North are better off staying together
and compromising on G. There is a critical value of G, G \widehat S
such that if G*SoGoG \widehat S, (3.3) is satisﬁed, and a critical
value of, G \widehat N such that if G*N4G4G \widehat N then (3.4)
is satisﬁed. With S in the majority, G will be chosen so that
vN G;2Mð Þ ¼ vNðGn Mð Þ;MÞ; ð3:5Þ
That is, G is the lowest level such that the North is indifferent to
seceding or not. As Fig. 2 makes clear, with very large differences
in preferences, there may not exist such a G, i.e.
G \widehat SoG \widehat N.
But note that if there can be discrimination in taxation, secession is
never desirable. Assume, for instance, that the tax rate on the South is
set so that TS¼G*S(M), and that on the North is
TN ¼ GGnS Mð Þ=M ð3:6Þ
Let vNd* be the maximized value of utility under this discriminatory
tax regime23. It should be clear that vNd*4vN(M) and those in the
South are better off as well (since G has increased, with no increase in
taxes.) In the case of pure Samuelsonian public goods, where the only
difference across communities lies in the amount of the good to be
consumed, there is always a unitary government that dominates,
provided discriminatory taxation is possible. It is Pareto superior to
secession. But in practice, it is often not – partly because it is often
difﬁcult to ascertain true preferences, and there is a bargaining
problem with information asymmetries; such bargaining is often
characterized by a breakdown.
It should be obvious though that this strong result holds only in the
case of pure public goods. If there are no economies of scale in
production, i.e. what is being provided is a publicly provided private
good, like education or health, then when there are differences in
tastes, there is no reason to maintain the unitary government.24
3.2. Differences in preferences over characteristics of the public
goods
But these results depend critically on individuals differing only
in their preferences with respect to the level of consumption of the
public good. But as we noted earlier, individuals in the two
communities may differ as well in the characteristics of the public
good that they prefer. And of course, if that is the case, the desired
level of consumption will depend on the characteristics of the
public good provided. Here, we focus on the case where the public
good can only be provided in one “type”, i.e. a military force that is
either aimed at defense or at offense.
This example illustrates a situation where some forms of expen-
diture may actually have a negative “beneﬁt” for some individuals.
While the “public good” – the invasion of Iraq – may have increased
the well-being of some citizens (those who enjoy seeing their country
dominate others, or who feel more secure knowing that their country
can do so), it may have decreased that of others (those who feel that
force should only be used in extreme circumstances, that there should
be an international rule of law, and who feel deeply about their
country violating agreed principles of international law, at least as
they see it.)
We generalize (3.1) by introducing a preferred characteristic of
the public good, denoted by α*i. Individual's utility is a function of
the gap between the characteristic of the good actually supplied
and the preferred type:
Vi ¼ ViðY–G=2M;G;α–αinÞ ¼ viðG;2M;αÞ: ð3:7Þ
Assume the South is in the majority (by one vote), and chooses
α to maximize its well being, so α¼αS*. Then, as before, we can
describe the utility of those in the North and South as a function of
G. In the case depicted in Fig. 3a, the utility of those in the North is
lowered (at each G) from what it would have been had the
preferred public good been provided, but even so, the North
prefers more G than the South. But Fig. 3b illustrates the case
where the North actually gets disutility out of the public good with
characteristic αS*, and so the optimal supply of the public good,
from the North's perspective, is actually zero.
Now, however, if the North separates, not only can it choose for
itself the level of G, but also its characteristic. It is now more likely
that secession is desirable, i.e. that
vNðGnS 2Mð Þ;2M;αSnÞovNðGnN Mð Þ;M;αNnÞ: ð3:8Þ
(This is the case illustrated in Fig. 3a) It is also more likely that
there is no feasible compromise, i.e. no {α, G} such that
VS G;2M;αð Þ4VSðGn Mð Þ;M;αSnÞ ð3:9Þ
and
VN G;2M;αð Þ4VNðGn Mð Þ;M;αNnÞ ð3:10Þ
That is, there is no set of values of {G, α} such that both the
South and North are better off staying together and compromising
on G and α. If there exists such a set of {G, α}, with S in the
majority, G will be chosen so that
VN G;2M;αð Þ ¼ VNðGn Mð Þ;M;αNn Þ; ð3:11Þ
that is, α and G are chosen to maximize the well-being of the
South, subject to the constraint that the North does not want to
secede.
There may exist no such compromise – even with tax discrimina-
tion – if preferences differ enough. This is illustrated by the case where
α can take on only two values, and where what the North views as a
public good (say a war in Iraq), the South views as a public bad.
3.2.1. A parametric example
In this section, we illustrate our analysis assuming that individuals
differ onlywith respect to their preferred type of public good. Assume
we can describe the public good by a number α, 0rαr1, and the
North's preferred characteristic is αN while that of the South is αS.
Assume that the level of utility enjoyed by an individual in the North if
Fig. 2. If there are large enough differences in preferences, then there exists no
value of G such that both the North and the South are better off together than apart,
under the assumption of uniform treatment.
23 That is, max|G VN(Y[(GGnS(M))/M], G) VNdn.
24 This analysis depends however on the strong assumption that those within
the community are identical. Recall our earlier discussion that when there are large
differences within each community and mobility, the equilibrium is, in general,
inefﬁcient; a unitary government might be able to internalize the externalities.
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consumption is C and the public good provision is described by {G, α}
is given by
UN ¼ U C;G 14k2 αNα 2h i  ð3:12Þ
that is, the value of each unit of the public good is diminished
by the “distance” from the preferred type, where k represents the
sensitivity of the individual to the characteristic of the public good.
A similar function describes the South. All individuals have the
same ﬁxed income Y, and face a tax rate of τ, so
C ¼ 1τð ÞY ð3:13Þ
and, normalizing the population of each region at 1,
G¼ 2τY : ð3:14Þ
Assume naturally that τ is chosen to maximize utility. Assume,
as before, that the South has a bare majority, but imposes its will,
both with respect to type and level of the public good. Then α¼αS,
and the utility that the North gets from each unit of public good is
1–4k2 αNαS 2: ð3:15Þ
The utility is negative if
αNαS41=2k; ð3:16Þ
i.e. if differences in preferences are too big, then those in the
North actually receive disutility from the public good. If differences
are even larger, i.e. if
αNαS41=k; ð3:17Þ
then there is no compromise.25 Choosing α that is half way
between that preferred by the North and South generates negative
utility from the public good to both the North and the South.
Assume, on the other hand, that differences in preferences are
not that great, but that the South imposes its preferences. Then the
South will want more public goods than the North (simply because
the value of each unit of the public good is higher), and it will
therefore vote for a higher G. The optimal G satisﬁes
USC ¼ 2USG ð3:18Þ
On the other hand, in the devolution equilibrium each region
provides its own public goods, which are assumed to be limited to
its own population.26 It must pay twice the “price” for its public
goods (there are half the number of people to share in the costs),
but it gets an α that is more to its liking. If
2 14k2 αNαS 2h i¼ 1 ð3:19Þ
then at any given τ (level of private consumption), in the
integrated economy the level of effective public consumption is
the same as in the economy with full devolution, and therefore the
level of utility is the same. It follows that devolution is desirable
(undesirable) if
8:5k αNαS
 4 oð Þ1; ð3:20Þ
i.e. if the differences between the two regions are large or the
sensitivity to differences is large.
On the other hand, consider the compromise where
α¼ αNþαS =2: ð3:21Þ
The value of α is chosen halfway between the preferred value
of each region. This would seem to be the most conducive to
integration. Devolution is still desirable (undesirable) as
2:5k αNαS
 4 oð Þ1 ð3:22Þ
The arguments for devolution are even greater when it comes
to the provision of publicly provided private goods for which there
are no economies of scale, but which are provided uniformly over
a region. Then, as we have noted, devolution is always desirable.
Notice that if there is a compromise between the two regions
(α is chosen half way between the two preferred values), because
of the symmetric form of the utility function, both the North and
the South agree on the tax rate. But if the North and the South
differ in their preferences for public goods when optimally
designed, then they will not want the same tax rate. Assume, for
instance that the North's utility function is as speciﬁed above
(3.12), but that of the South is given by
US ¼U C; ξG 14k2 αNα 2h i ; ð3:23Þ
where ξo1. Then, with devolution, the South will want G and τ
to be smaller than the level preferred by the North.
If the publicly provided good is a local (regional) public good,
with no spill overs from one region to the other, with each region
Fig. 3. (a) The South chooses a form of the public good that maximizes its utility.
Even though the North would prefer a different variety, and even though the South
chooses a level of public goods that is lower than the North prefers, the utility of
the North is higher when the two regions remain together, simply because of the
returns to scale. (b) The two regions may have very large differences in preferences,
so much so that what is viewed as a good by the South is perceived as a bad by the
North. Obviously, in this case, separation is desirable.
25 That is, there is no value of α such that 4k2 (αNα)2o1 and 4k2
(αSα)2o1.
26 Obviously, if these were true “national” public goods, each region would
beneﬁt from the public goods provided by the other region. As we noted in Section 2,
we can think of there being a cost for extending the geographical reach of a public
good. In the case of full devolution, each region would be unwilling to pay even that
slight cost. The analysis can easily be generalized to the case where each region
provides a public good which partially (fully) reaches those in the other region and/
or in which one region pays the other region to extend the reach of its publicly
provided goods.
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choosing its own value of α, then with ξ¼1 there is no reason for
independence (rather than just devolution). But, of course, there is
no reason (within this model) against it. There are no real beneﬁts
or costs to integration. On the other hand, if ξo1, even if each
region gets to choose its own α, there is a real cost to integration
unless the North gets full discretion in the imposition of its tax
rate, in which case (in this limited model) there is de facto
independence.
In the next section, however, we provide conditions under
which devolution does not sufﬁce, even if ξ¼1 and each region
has full discretion in its choice of public goods. Independence is
required.
Part II. Limitations of Devolution of Expenditures in the
Absence of Devolution of Taxation
A standard model for devolution entails tax rates set by the central
government, but regional governments being given discretion on how
money is spent. This allows differences in local preferences to be
reﬂected in public choices. This roughly describes the situation in the
United Kingdom, where the Scottish government had discretion over
expenditures on, for instance, health and education.27 In the next
section, wewill explainwhy this form of devolutionwill not, in general,
result in an efﬁcient allocation of publicly provided goods when there
are public investment goods. In Section 5. we extend the analysis to the
case where the region contemplating secession is small.
4. Underinvestment in public goods in the absence of
independence
Assume that there is a common tax rate, τ, which is used to ﬁnance
the provision of public goods, but each region is allowed to choose its
own public goods (with its own characteristics.) But assume that the
region can choose between a publicly provided consumption good (or
a local public good) and a public investment good which increases tax
revenues next period, but that the tax revenue generated by the public
investment is shared with the other region. We assume that the
publicly provided goods are local public goods, so there are no
economies of scale in providing the goods across regions. This
obviously biases our results towards independence. In practice, most
of the publicly provided goods which are subject to devolution are local
public goods or publicly provided public goods. We continue with our
parametric example; but it should be clear that it is easy to generalize
the results.
Then utility in each region can be described by
U ¼U1j 1τ1 Y1;Gcj
 





where ρ is the gross return on public investments, Y1 is ﬁrst period
income, Y2 is second period income, τ1 is the tax rate the ﬁrst period, τ2
is the tax rate the second period, and where Gcj is jth region's
consumption (ﬁrst period) of public consumption goods. Spending on
public investment goods is the difference between tax revenues and
spending on public consumption goods, i.e. τ2ρ (2τ1Y1GcNGcS) is the
total income generated by that investment, half of which is allocated to
each of the two regions. Gcj is chosen to maximize U, i.e.
∂U1j=∂UGcj ¼ τ2ρ ∂U2j=∂G2
 
=2; ð4:2Þ
where τ2 ρ/2 is the increase in consumption of public goods in
the second period as a result of the increased spending on public
goods in the ﬁrst period, and (∂Uj2/∂G2) is the marginal utility of
that increased consumption. Each region, by increasing
consumption of public goods, gets the full beneﬁt of the public
consumption good, but pays only half the price in terms of the lost
next period income from the reduced public investment. There
will be too large an expenditure on public consumption goods
relative to public investment goods.
With independence, utility is given by
U ¼U1j 1τ1 Y1;Gcj
 
þU2j 1τ2 Y2þτ2ρ τ1Y1Gcj
  
: ð4:3Þ
In the symmetric equilibrium, (4.1) and (4.3) are identical, but
in the case of independence, the region (now country) chooses Gcj
to maximize (4.3) yielding
∂U1j=∂UGcj ¼ τ2ρ ∂U2j=∂G2
 
; ð4:4Þ
i.e. the allocation to public consumption goods is now efﬁcient.
Independence is (under the stipulated conditions) always prefer-
able to simple devolution.
The inefﬁciency we have noted can be corrected by not sharing
tax revenue; but in this model, that is tantamount to independence.
Alternatively, one can try to establish “incentive compatible”
mechanisms, for instance, by taxing the additional revenue arising
from public investment (if one can ascertain what that is) only in
the region which makes the public investment. We then maximize
U ¼U1jðð1τ1ÞY1;GcjÞþUj2ðð1τ2ÞY2þτ2ρðτ1Y1GcJÞÞ; ð4:5Þ
which yields the same allocation as (4.3), with the optimality
condition given by (4.4).
5. Small regions
So far, we have considered two regions of equal size. The
argument for devolution and independence for a small region is
slightly different.
5.1. Publicly provided consumption goods
If there are economies of scale, e.g. associated with a pure public
good, the economies of scale will (in the limit, of an arbitrarily small
region) always outweigh the “tailoring” effect, except when the
disparity in preferences is very large. But as we have noted, a large
fraction of public expenditures is for publicly provided private
goods and for local/regional public goods, for which the economies
of scale are less signiﬁcant, or may not be there at all.
There still can exist important cross border externalities: with
devolution, the small region can free ride on the public invest-
ments made nationally, and the tax revenue beneﬁts of public
investments made by the small region are largely not captured by
the region. If there is only one small region, the externalities
(especially the former one) may not matter much; but in a nation
consisting of many small regions, the aggregate consequences can
be serious. Especially in the absence of strong economies of scale,
the inability to effectively internalize these externalities means
that independence may be preferable to devolution.
Assume there is a single small region. The political equilibrium for
the nationwill then reﬂect the preferences of the dominant region. Let
us assume that the South is the dominant region. To continue with the
model of Section 3, α*¼αS, and τ is set to maximize28
US ¼U 1τð ÞY ; τYð Þ ð5:1Þ
27 In practice, matters are always more complicated. There is often discretion
on the imposition of some local taxes and some restrictions on how the regional
governments can spend their money.
28 We continue with the normalization that the population in the South is
unity. This formulation assumes that the North is miniscule relative to the South.
The analysis for the more general case is straightforward.
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so that
USC ¼USG ð5:2Þ
Utility in the North is now
UN ¼ U C;G 14k2 αNαS 2h i : ð5:3Þ
We denote (as in Section 2) the average returns to scale in the
public good by β, 0rβr1, and assume that the ratio of the
population of the North to the South is M. We continue with the
normalization that the population of the South is unity. Then with
integration and a tax rate of τ, and a pure public good (β¼1), the
public good supply (per capita) in the North is (Mþ1) τY. If the good is
a publicly provided private good, then the public good supply (per
capita) in the North is τY. More generally, for a mixed public good, the
public good supply is approximated by (Mβþ1)τY.
Hence at any given τ, utility would be higher with devolution if
14k2 αNαS 2n o Mβþ1 Z1 ð5:4Þ
or
βr 4k2 αNαS 2n o=½14k2 αNαS 2gM βn: ð5:5Þ
If preference differences are not too large (|αNαS|o1/2k),
then with a large enough population, devolution is never desir-
able. But for any ﬁxed M, if the returns to scale are small enough, i.
e. βrβ*, devolution is always desirable.29
If preference differences are large enough, what is a public
good in the South is viewed as a public bad in the North, and
devolution is always desirable.30
5.2. Public investment
Assume now that there is a public investment good and there
are no differences in preferences. Again, the South effectively sets
the tax rate to maximize its utility, while, if M is small enough, the
North, not recapturing any of the beneﬁts of its investments in
public goods, only spends its public funds on consumption (under
devolution.) The North free rides on the public investment of the
South and would never be better off with independence.
But now assume that the North and the South have different
preferences, so that the South puts more emphasis on current
consumption of public goods. We write the (reduced form) utility
function of the North and South as
UN ¼ UN1ðCN1;ψNGNcÞþUN2 CN2
 
; ð5:7aÞ





where ψNr1 and ψSZ1. Then it is easy to show that the
consumption of public goods the ﬁrst period increases with ψS,
and second period income (consumption) decreases. Take the
limiting case, where all of the public good expenditure (as
determined by the South) goes into consumption. Then the North's
utility with devolution is approximately (assuming that the small
region recaptures essentially none of the incremental returns from
its investments)
UN ¼ UN1 1τ1d
 
Y ;ψNτ1dY
 þUN2 Y2 1τ2  ; ð5:8Þ
(in the obvious notation where t1d is the ﬁrst period tax rate
under devolution, where the tax rate is set by the South, with
revenues shared proportionately with the North).
With independence, the North's utility is given by the max-
imized value (with respect to τ1I and G1c where τ1I is the ﬁrst period
tax rate under independence, where now the tax rate is set by the
North) of
UN ¼ UN1ðð1τ1 IÞY ;ψNG1cÞþUN2ðð1τ2ÞY2þτ2ρðτ1IY1GclÞÞ;
ð5:9Þ
taking for the moment τ2 as ﬁxed. 31 It should be apparent that
(5.9) always exceeds (5.8), except in a corner solution, whereψN is
so large or ρ is so small that the North spends all of its public
expenditures on consumption. Even then, (5.9) will be larger than
(5.8) because τ1I is chosen to reﬂect the North's preferences for
public goods, not the South's. Thus, there is a critical magnitude of
differences in preferences (differences between ψS and ψN) such
that independence is preferred to devolution. If preferences (judg-
ments about returns to public investments) between the small region
and the rest of the nation are large enough, independence is
preferred; the gains from tailoring public spending to one's prefer-
ences and judgments outweigh the potential free rider beneﬁts under
devolution.
6. Concluding comments
This paper was partly inspired by my earlier work with Richard
Arnott on externalities and public goods. But, as I noted in the
introduction, it was also partly inspired by the debate in 2014 over
Scottish independence. There had already been considerable
devolution. What were the beneﬁts and costs to independence,
to going beyond the level of devolution which existed at the time,
especially in the context of the EU, where there would presumably
continue to be free mobility of goods, people, and capital, so that
all, or least most, of the economies of scale and scope in private
production and consumption could be retained?
Here, we note that while some of the debate did center on two of
the issues raised in this paper, four other topics also played a role.
There was considerable focus on differences in preferences, especially
for what we have referred to as privately provided public goods,
where economies of scale are not signiﬁcant (so that the cost of
independence would not be signiﬁcant.) Scotland and England had
been going in markedly different directions. Scotland seemed to be
aspiring to create a Nordic style social democratic state. England
seemed to be aspiring to create an American style society, marked by
high levels of social, political, and economic inequalities. Scotland was
providing free university tuition; England was raising tuition fees.
England was taking actions that were seen as undermining the
country's National Health Service (NHS), yet the principle of access
to health care for all, had strong support within Scotland.
In the case of the perhaps most important pure public good,
expenditures on the military, differences in attitudes were so great
that what was viewed as a public good in England (exempliﬁed by
the participation in the War in Iraq) was widely viewed as a public
bad in Scotland.32
The problems with partial devolution that was the focus of Part
II of the paper were also important: the expenditures on education
were viewed as investments, as were other expenditures on
children and those on industrial policies. The Scottish government29 Note that with devolution, the south will set its tax rate at the same rate as
the North if the publicly provided good is a privately provided public good, but
otherwise, it will set a lower tax rate and enjoy a lower supply of public goods and
a higher supply of private goods. Hence (5.5) is a sufﬁcient condition for devolution,
but not a necessary condition.
30 As we noted earlier, to many, perhaps most, in Scotland, military expendi-
tures, e.g. on a war in Iraq, may have been a public bad rather than a public good.
31 But of course, with independence, the South will have full discretion to set
the tax rate, and will choose it to maximize the utility of its citizens, providing a
further beneﬁt from independence.
32 Of course, in both England and Scotland there was far from unanimity.
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was keenly aware that it would reap little of the returns from
these investments.
Of the four other issues that received prominence, two were
technical issues involving economics – but in which there were
considerable misunderstandings.
There was a heated debate about the directions of net transfers –
whether Scotland was subsidizing the rest of the UK or being
subsidized, and therefore whether independence, which would halt
the ﬂow of subsidies, would increase or decrease the well-being of
Scotland. In the end, the numbers in either direction seemed small
compared to other potential costs or beneﬁts of independence and the
risks associated with al arrangements.
The most complex debate surrounded the monetary system post
independence. A monetary policy extending over multiple jurisdic-
tions can be viewed as a public good provided uniformly across those
jurisdictions – a public good for which tastes can differ markedly, so
there can be marked differences in views about the form that such
policies should take. Indeed, it is an example of a public good that
some might view as a “good”, and others as a “bad”. (Tight monetary
policy might have beneﬁts to some jurisdictions/regions and large
costs for others.) The literature on optimal currency areas attempts to
spell out the conditions under which a shared currency (the common
provision of this public good) might be desirable.
It had originally been proposed that Scotland and the remain-
der of Great Britain remain within a monetary union. This was
done to minimize the transition uncertainty. The subsequent euro-
crisis, highlighting the problems of making a currency union work,
cast a damper over this idea.33 But a central problemwith the euro
was that the differences among the eurozone countries were
enormous compared to that between Scotland and England. (In
terms of the formalisms of the models presented here, the
differences in “preferences” with respect to this particular public
good were relatively small.) The conditions that Mundell (1961)
had set forth for an optimal currency area were more clearly
nearly satisﬁed.
When it was suggested that England might refuse to agree to a
monetary union, one response was that Scotland could use the pound
sterling as its currency evenwithout the permission of UK (as Ecuador
and Panama use the dollar.) Of course, this would entail Scotland not
enjoying the seigniorage, but that was likely limited in any case
(especially once one considered that Scotland would be entitled to but
a small share of the entire value of the seigniorage for the UK.) And it
would mean that Scotland would have no say in the determination of
monetary policy. But, again, given its relatively small size, its role in
monetary policy was already limited.
It might, in any case, be better for Scotland to have its own
currency–as many other small countries do. Some (like Denmark) are
pegged; some (like Iceland) are ﬂoating. In short, monetary institu-
tions do make a difference–poorly designed institutions like those of
the eurozone can have a disastrous effect on the economy. But there
are many monetary arrangements that canwork. There was no reason
to believe that Scotland could not design a set of monetary arrange-
ments that would work for its economy. Indeed, this was another
public good where preferences differed signiﬁcantly, making the case
for independence even greater.34
Two other issues, though, played an important role in the debate,
one which is associated with virtually any major institutional reform,
and both of which should be the focus of more research going
forward. The critics of independence emphasized the risks: there
were uncertainties associated with a new political institutional
arrangement, and not surprisingly, risk-averse individuals focused on
the downside potential. Some banks threatened to move their head-
quarters, perhaps out of fear that the Scottish government would be
less captured by the ﬁnancial sector than that in Westminster. But
defenders of independence responded that this might even be
positive: scotland could design a regulatory regime that would
facilitate the creation of a ﬁnancial sector more focused on serving
its citizens and its economy than on speculation, market exploitation,
etc. And net, the ﬁnancial sector as structured had been a drain, given
the huge expenditures that had been required by the bail-outs. Better
regulation might reduce the risks posed to the rest of society by the
ﬁnancial sector.
Most importantly, there were large risks whether Scotland
remained within the UK or not. The UK had an upcoming referendum
about leaving the EU. If Scotland had to choose between being part of
the EU or in a unionwith England, all the arguments about economies
of scale and scope suggested that the former was far preferable to the
latter. What would happen if the politics of England continued to drift
towards the right – with larger and larger differences between the
policies which would have been preferred by Scottish citizens? What
would happen if England continued its course of unbalanced growth,
with the counties in the South doing so much better than the rest of
the country?
Inevitably, major changes in institutional arrangements such as
that posed by Scottish independence bring countries into unchar-
tered territory, often where there is limited relevant evidence from
previous similar experiments. Standard economic models, resting
on well-deﬁned beliefs, typically based on rational expectations,
provide little guidance in these situations.
The second set of issues relates to national identity, social cohesion,
and societal performance, subjects to which economists and other
social scientists are just beginning to devote more attention.35 There is
some evidence that ﬁrms in which there is more social cohesion
perform better36; so too, there is increasing evidence that societies
with greater social cohesion – trust, social capital – perform better.37 It
is possible that independence could foster a great sense of identity and
social cohesion, and especially so during the nation-building stage.38
In the end, it appears that voters in Scotland were more inﬂuenced
by the possible down-side risks than by the possibilities of a national
rejuvenation, of a second Scottish Enlightenment, with a new set of
aspirations and renewed sense of identity that independence might
have brought about. The campaign became, however, distracted on
some second order issues, and even the more mundane economic
issues that we have addressed here – the balancing out of returns to
scale, tailoring of public goods to societal preferences, and uninterna-
lized externalities – were given short shrift.
Ongoing debates around the world make it clear that questions
surrounding the creation of political entities will continue to be at the
forefront of public discussions. In many, perhaps most, countries. the
political debate will center around political issues, included those that
were central to the Scottish debate. This paper has provided a broad
framework within which one can analyze the economics, the beneﬁts
and costs of devolution, independence, and integration. Within that
framework, we have demonstrated a range of conditions under which
devolution enhances societal welfare, and in which devolution of
expenditures may not sufﬁce – independence may be preferable even
33 See Krugman (2014).
34 There is an increasing recognition that the conduct of monetary policy can
affect the distribution of income. (See, e.g. Stiglitz, 2012). Different polities have
different attitudes towards inequality.
35 These subjects have ﬂourished particularly with the increasing importance
associated with behavioral economics. (See, for instance, Akerlof and Kranton,
2010; World Bank, 2015).
36 For a discussion of some of the evidence and references, (see .
37 See Algan and Cahuc (2013) and Easterly et al. (2006), and the references
cited there.
38 But even here, it is important to observe that there were differences in
preferences within Scotland. Some saw their sense of identity as connected with
being in the UK including many who had migrated from south of the border.
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in the presence of the returns to scale associated with the provision of
public goods when there are important public investments.
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